Many computer systems are designed to make it easy for end-users to install and update software. An undesirable side effect, from the perspective of many software producers, is that hostile end-users may analyze or tamper with the software being installed or updated. This paper proposes a way to avoid the side effect without affecting the ease of installation and updating. We construct a computer system M with the following properties: 1) the end-user may install a program P in any conveniently accessible area of M; 2) the program P contains encoded instructions whose semantics are obscure and difficult to understand; and 3) an internal interpreter W, embedded in a non-accessible area of M, interprets the obfuscated instructions without revealing their semantics. Our W is a finite state machine (FSM) which gives context-dependent semantics and operand syntax to the encoded instructions in P; thus, attempts to statically analyze the relation between instructions and their semantics will not succeed. We present a systematic method for constructing a P whose instruction stream is always interpreted correctly regardless of its input, even though changes in input will (in general) affect the execution sequence of instructions in P. Our framework is easily applied to conventional computer systems by adding a FSM unit to a virtual machine or a reconfigurable processor.
Introduction
Security is an overarching problem for today's computer systems including personal computers, their peripherals, consumer electric devices, and any other machinery that contains software programs. Some systems administrators, and some software suppliers, require assurance that endusers will not analyze or tamper with protected programs or data. For example, a typical software digital rights management (DRM) system is designed to run in a "hostile" environment where the end-user is not fully trusted by the supplier of the content whose rights are being managed. Typically, these DRM systems contain cryptographic keys and algorithms that need to be kept secret [1] . There is, however, no known method for completely concealing these keys and algorithms from a determined attacker. For example, the keys for the CSS encryption standard for DVD media content were revealed by a "crack" in 1999. As a result, programs which subvert DVD copy protection are now widely distributed through the Internet [2] . Embedded software in * Presently, with Graduate School of Information Science, Nara Institute of Science and Technology, Ikoma-shi, 630-0192 Japan.
a) E-mail: akito-m@is.naist.jp b) E-mail: antoine@cs.auckland.ac.nz c) E-mail: cthombor@cs.auckland.ac.nz consumer electric devices, e.g., mobile phones and set-top boxes, also needs to be protected since these devices are also susceptible to attacks by hostile users [3] . However, it seems impossible to completely prohibit end-user access to the software implementation, without also making it impossible to update this software to patch a "bug" or add a "feature."
In order to hide secrets in software implementation, software obfuscation techniques have been proposed [4] - [6] . Software obfuscations transform a program so that it is more difficult to understand, yet is functionally equivalent to the original program. Theoreticians have proved that "perfect obfuscation" is feasible on some programs but not for all programs, under a theoretically tractable but still interesting definition of "obfuscation" [7] , [8] . However, it seems intuitively clear that a clever and well-equipped attacker would eventually understand any desired aspect of any program, no matter how well it is obfuscated, because any obfuscated program still contains all its original semantics. Thus, to maximise the security of a program, the widest possible variety of complementary obfuscation techniques should be used, for this will dissuade the widest possible range of attackers.
Instead of obfuscating the program itself, this paper presents a concept for obfuscating the program interpretation [9] , [10] . If the interpretation being taken is obscure and thus it can not be understood by a hostile user, the program being interpreted is also kept obscure since the user lacks the information about "how to read it." This idea is similar to the randomized instruction-set approach [11] , [12] ; however, in the randomization approach, the interpretation itself is not obscure because randomized instructions still have a one-to-one map to their semantics. On the other hand, our aim is to provide a dynamic map between instructions and their semantics.
In this paper we describe enhancements to our recently proposed framework for constructing an interpreter W, which carries out obfuscated interpretations for a given program P [9] . Here P is a translated version of an original program P 0 written in a common programming language (such as Java bytecode and x86 assembly.) The obfuscated interpretation means that an interpretation W for a given instruction c is not fixed; specifically, the interpretation W(c) is determined not only by c itself but also by previous instructions input to W (Figure 1) .
In order to realize an obfuscated interpretation in W, we employ a FSM that takes as input an instruction c where each state makes a different interpretation for c. Since transitions between states are made according to the input, the interpretation for a particular type of instruction varies with respect to previous inputs. Such a W we call a FSM-based interpreter. In our framework, W is built independent of P 0 ; thus, many programs run on a single interpreter W, and any of the programs can be easily replaced by an updated program.
In our original proposal [9] , we had required the opcode encoding to preserve the number and type of the operands. In this paper we demonstrate how to build a FSM without this restriction. This increases the range of possibilities from which the FSM W is chosen, which has an effect analogous to increasing the "key length" of a cryptographic cipher. That is, the proposal in this paper is more resilient to brute-force enumerative ("naïve key-search") attacks. This paper also extends its predecessor by demonstrating an example in x86 assembly code rather than in Java bytecode; this extension required us to add a dead-register analysis to our process for the obfuscation of code by interpretation. Note that a full but older version of our proposal has been described in our technical report [10] .
In some sense, the mechanism of our obfuscated interpretation is a kind of stream cipher where a ciphered bit sequence is decoded one bit (or one byte) at a time dependent on its context [13] ; however, conventional stream ciphers cannot be simply applied for encrypting the instructions in P since the instruction stream (execution sequence) of P varies according to conditional branches taken on its input. In our framework, through the process of translation P 0 → P, we inject dummy instructions (or a special instruction for FSM control) into P to force expedient state transitions in W so that P is always interpreted correctly regardless of its input.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a framework for obfuscated interpretation is described. Section 3 shows a case study of obfuscated interpretation. Section 4 discusses several attacks and defences. Section 5 compares our approach with conventional software encryption approaches. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper with some suggestions for future work.
Framework for Obfuscated Interpretation

Overview
Before going into the mechanism of the FSM-based interpreter W, we describe the surroundings of W (Figure 2 ), then clarify the aim of our framework. The following are brief definitions of materials related to W. P 0 : is a target program intended to be hidden from hostile users. We assume that P 0 is written in a low level programming language, such as bytecode or machine code, where each statement in P 0 consists of a single opcode and (occasionally) some operands. W 0 : is a common (conventional) interpreter for P 0 , such as a Java Virtual Machine, a Common Language Runtime or an x86 processor. P x : is a "translated program" containing encoded instructions whose semantics are determined during execution according to their context. This P x is an equivalently translated version of P 0 , i.e., P x has the same functionality as P 0 . I: is an input of P 0 and P x . Note that P 0 and P x take the same input. x: is the specification of a FSM that defines a dynamic map between encoded instructions (inputs of the FSM) and their semantics (outputs of the FSM). This x is used in both a FSM-based interpreter W x and a program translator T x . W x : is a FSM-based interpreter that can evaluate encoded instructions of P x according to the current state of the FSM built inside. This W x is an extension of W 0 with a FSM unit of given specifications x. T x : is a translated program translator that automatically translates P 0 into P x with respect to the specifications x. M x : is a computer system delivered to and/or owned by a program user.
In our framework, we assume W x is hidden from the program user as much as possible, e.g., if M x is an electronic device such as a mobile phone, then W x should be built in a non-accessible part of M x so as to prevent the user from reading the implementation of W x. However, P x must be delivered to the user and put in an accessible area of M x so as to enable its updating. There should be many functionally different W x , and ideally each machine M x would be manufactured with a different W x so that an adversary cannot easily guess one machine's interpreter after having "cracked" some other machine's interpreter.
Building an efficient T x in a systematic manner is a fundamental part of this framework. Since P x is quite different from ordinary programs, even though the program developer knows x, writing P x from scratch is extremely difficult for the developer. In our framework, we provide a systematic method T x to construct P x from any given P 0 and x.
FSM-Based Interpreter
Design Types
We identify five types of design choices for the FSM-based interpreter, which are dependent upon the instruction set used for P x . Let Ins P 0 and Ins P x be the instruction sets for P 0 and P x , and let L P 0 and L P x be the programming language for P 0 and P x , respectively. We call Ins P 0 a set of "cleartext instruction" and Ins P x a "encoded instruction." We define five types of designs. Note: in our original proposal [9] we had not defined "Type 2.5."
(Type 1) Ins P x is the same as Ins P 0 and all P x have correct static semantics in L P 0 (e.g. P x would pass Java's bytecode verifier if P 0 were valid Java bytecode) although the dynamic semantics are determined during execution. Thus P x is executable in the original interpreter W 0 although its outputs would be incorrect. (Type 2) L P x has the same syntax as L P 0 , but the static semantics of P x may be incorrect (e.g., if L P 0 is Java bytecode, the stack signature of some opcodes in P x may be incorrect). The number of different FSMs that could be used to interpret P x is larger than in Type 1, which will increase the size of the search space in a bruteforce attack. However, there is a security tradeoff, for an attacker might use a static syntax checker to quickly discard many possible de-obfuscations in a brute-force search. So we do not, as yet, know which type of obfuscation will give the most security in practice. (Type 2.5) L P x has different operand syntax to L P 0 ; individual opcodes in P 0 are translated into opcodes in P x with the same number of bytes; and the opcode sets and encodings in Ins P 0 and Ins P x are identical. Because the type and number of operands (and their specifiers) associated with each opcode may differ from L P 0 , P x is generally not a valid program in L P 0 . The number of different FSMs that could be used to interpret P x is larger than in Type 2. (Type 3) Ins P x includes Ins P 0 with some extra ("Type-3") instructions. These may be used to control the FSM. The number of different FSMs is larger than in Type 2.5. (Type 4) Ins P x differs completely from Ins P 0 , however, there exists some (secret) many-to-one mapping which transforms Ins P x into an Ins P 0 instruction set. That is, P x appears to be written in a totally different language than P 0 . The number of different FSMs is larger than in Type 3. In the rest of this paper, we focus on Type 2.5 designs. Figure 3 shows a suitable architecture for a FSM-based interpreter, characterized by simplified pipelined stages of interpretation. In this paper we focus on the opcodes to be translated in the FSM. In Type 2.5 design, the FSM-based interpreter is augmented by an additional pipeline stage, called a FSM unit, which translates a "Type-2.5" encoded opcode into a cleartext opcode, passing it to a conventional opcode decode unit. Then, the cleartext opcode is (syntactically) decoded, and the number of operands to be fetched is determined. After the required operands are fetched in an operand fetch unit, the instruction is executed in an execute unit. This architecture is applicable to many present Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) and reconfigurable processors.
Architecture
The FSM unit has a switch to start/stop the obfuscated interpretation to enable us to run both an ordinary program and a translated program on the same interpreter. If the FSM unit is stopped, the interpreter works as an ordinary one, and if it is started, the interpreter works as a FSM-based interpreter. The start/stop signal could be invoked by a system call, or by a special Type-3 instruction.
FSM Unit
The FSM unit (denoted as w x ) is a DFA (Deterministic Finite Automaton) defined by 6-tuple (Q, Σ, Ψ, ∆, Λ, q0) where
.., λ n−1 } is the n-tuple of all output functions. q 0 ∈ Q is the starting state of the FSM.
In Type 2.5 design, the instruction set for P x is the same as that for P 0 , i.e., Ins P x = Ins P 0 . We assume Ins P x = Σ ∪ O where elements c i ∈ Σ are encoded instructions, and o i ∈ O are non-encoded instructions. This means that P x contains both c i and o i , and, if the FSM unit recognizes a c i ∈ Σ as input, then it is translated into a cleartext opcode by the FSM and it is passed to the execute unit, otherwise an input o i ∈ O will not be translated (directly passed to the execute unit). In our Type-2.5 design, each underlined symbol c i in Ψ denotes the normal (cleartext) semantics for the correspondingly indexed opcode c i ∈ Σ.
The input (and output) alphabet is partitioned into two classes by an integer b, such that symbols c 0 , c 1 , ..., c b−1 are in the first class C 1 (of branching opcodes including non-conditional jump) and the remaining symbols c b , c b+1 , ..., c n−1 are in the second class C 2 (of non-branching opcodes). The FSM design has the following constraints.
1. Each δ i : Σ → Q is a bijection; we write its inverse as Figure 4 shows a simple example of w x where This w x takes an encoded opcode c i ∈ {add, sub} as an input, translates it into its semantics (cleartext opcode) c i ∈ {add, sub}, and outputs c i . Figure 5 shows an example of interpretation for an instruction stream given by this w x . Obviously, even this simple FSM has the ability to conduct an obfuscated interpretation. As shown in Figure 5 , the opcode "add" is interpreted as either add or sub according to its context.
Program Translator
In order to develop a program executable on the FSM-based interpreter, a program translator T x : P 0 → P x is indispensable. Since the interpreter w x translates encoded instructions in P x into cleartext instructions in P 0 , an inverse interpreter of w x (denoted by w x −1 ) is useful for translating instructions in P 0 into ones in P x . However, building w x −1 is not sufficient to process the translation T x : P 0 → P x . Let us assume we have w x of Figure 4 , and P 0 of Figure 6 that computes a summation p := 1 + 2 + 3 + ... + n. The loop in P 0 must be taken into account. We need a consistency of interpretation: the instructions in each execution of the loop in P x must always be translated into the same instruction stream (in this case, "add p, x" and "sub x, 1"). In other words, w x must always be in the same state every time the execution reaches the control-flow junction at the top of the loop body. Taking advantage of constraints 4 and 5 in Section 2.2.3, we inject a sequence of dummy instructions into the tail of the loop, so that the FSM will reach the desired state at the top of the loop without changing the program semantics.
From the above discussion, we first build an inverse interpreter w x −1 , then we use this w x −1 and dummy instruction sequences to translate P 0 into P x . Our w x −1 is the DFA defined by 6-tuples (Q , Σ , Ψ , ∆ , Λ , q 0 ) where Next, we give a procedure for the translation T x : P 0 → P x . Appendix shows this procedure where:
PC is a program counter (we assume PC is a line number of P 0 ). code P 0 (PC) is an instruction in P 0 at PC. code P x (PC) is an instruction in P x at PC. q s ∈ Q is a state of w x −1 . state(PC) is a state in which code P 0 (PC) was interpreted. We also assume this procedure T x uses a stack (denoted as S tack), and its operation push and pop, to accumulate values of PC. Figure 8 shows an example of P x translated from P 0 of Figure 6 . In this example, a dummy instruction "add p, 0" is inserted into P x to force the state transition q 1 → q 0 so that w x comes to q 0 every time the execution reaches the entry point of the loop.
Case Study
Program Translation
In this section we explain a more complex example of program translation T x : P 0 → P x using the inverse interpreter w x −1 given in Table 1 . This w x −1 is designed for programs written in an Intel x86 instruction set. We use the AT&T syntax (GNU assembler format) to write assembly codes in L P 0 and L P x . Our sample w x −1 has eight states Q = {q 0 , q 1 , ...q 7 } with q 0 a starting state, and has eight types of instructions Σ = {jmp, jne, pushl, decl, movl 89 , subl, movl 8B , leal}. Here, "movl 89 " indicates MOV instructions whose opcode byte is "89," and "movl 8B " indicates the "8B" variant of this opcode. Two instructions (jmp and jne) are branching instructions (class C 1 ). The other six are nonbranching instructions (class C 2 ). For each instruction in Table 2, a binary (hexadecimal) representation of the opcode is shown. registers, and these must be "dead registers" to define our desired no-op function. Dead registers can be detected easily by static analysis of P 0 [14] . For increased security, in a future implementation, we would make it difficult for an attacker to discover that these registers are in fact dead; for example, we could add their values to the parameter list of a function so that they would be pushed and popped during function calls and returns. The target P 0 , which is to be translated, is shown in Figure 9 . This P 0 is a x86 assembly program, compiled by gcc from the C source program. This P 0 computes a summation of odd numbers p := 1 + 3 + 5 + ... + n. Figure 10 shows P x corresponding to this P 0 . In Figure 9 , numbers described in the leftmost column indicate line numbers, and their corresponding lines are described in Figure 10 as well. The second column in Figure 9 describes the state of w −1 in which each instruction is interpreted. Due to limited space, we have not included a detailed explanation of our translation process in this paper. However, a full explanation of a sample translation of a Java bytecode program for a Type-2 interpreter is shown in our previous paper [9] .
On the basis of our case study, we can estimate the overheads of our protection mechanism on a typical x86 code. Such codes have approximately one branch for every seven instructions, and we will introduce approximately 1.5 dummy instructions for each branch. Thus the code- size of a translated program will increase modestly: by approximately 20%. Because our dummy instructions have no data or control hazards (i.e., they will cause neither cache misses nor branch mispredictions), they will execute more efficiently than an average untranslated instruction. We conclude that the runtime and space overhead of our translation process will be at most 20% on a typical x86 code.
Obscurity of Translated Program
The program P x obtained by our translation has some fundamental characteristics to make itself obscure. Below we describe the characteristics of P x in Figure 10 compared with P 0 in Figure 9 .
1. As described in 2.2.1, P x uses the opcodes of an original x86 assembly language L P 0 , but it is not itself a valid x86 program since the operand signatures in P x are not all correct in L P 0 . For example, in line 2 of Figure 10 , the "pushl" opcode requires one operand in L P 0 , however, it has two operands in P x . This indicates P x cannot be parsed accurately by a disassembler for L P x into instructions. 2. Instructions in P x do not have static binding to their semantics. For example, "pushl" in line 2 is interpreted as "movl89" via w x (see the same line in Figure 9 ), but in line 24, it is interpreted as "leal." Note that dummy instructions, for example the one between line 25 and 26, also have non static semantics, so they are not statically recognizable as dummy instructions. 3. The control flow of P 0 is not apparently preserved in P x , i.e., if P x were executed without translation "just as it appears," it would take different branches than P 0 . For example, the conditional jump "jne" in line 10 is actually an unconditional JMP.
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our scheme against adversaries with varying resources, knowledge, and persistence. However, due to limited space, here we describe the summary of our analysis. For more detailed analysis, please see our technical report [10] . Generally speaking, our security objective is to prevent an adversary from understanding (and also tampering with) the protected software. However, it is difficult to prevent all the imaginable attacks. For example, it is difficult to completely prevent the making of small alterations in a program to defeat a license check [15] . In this paper, we limit our objective to prevent the adversary from understanding the protected software sufficiently well to make large-scale alterations in its behavior, for example by identifying, copying, and re-using a substantial portion of its code (or its embedded "secrets" such as a decryption key) in another software product. Many cryptograhic systems require this kind of tamper resistance [1] . In this paper, we consider that if an attacker could discover the specification of the FSM, then, the attacker is able to understand P x sufficiently well to modify P x . The immediate goal of this section is to analyze the difficulty of discovering the specification of the FSM.
We characterize an adversary's knowledge and resources along three dimensions (labeled A, B, C), as listed below. To simplify our analyses, we consider only adversaries who are equal on all dimensions. An adversary that is at level-0 is a naive end-user. Our level-1 adversary is an end-user with very limited technical skill and ability. Our level-2 adversary has a debugger and good technical skills.
(A) FSM Interpretation 0. The level-0 adversary has a computer system M x (containing interpreter W x as shown in Figure 2 ) and a copy of the translated (protected) program P x . Note that these resources are required to execute the protected program. 1. The adversary has an algorithmic understanding of the principles of FSM-based interpretation, as described in this article. 2. The adversary has a debugger with "breakpoint" functionality, attached to a translated software implementation of W x . Alternatively, the adversary has a logic state analyzer, attached to the inputs and outputs of a hardware implementation of W x .
(B) System Observation 0. In a level-0 observation, the adversary observes the audio-visual outputs of the computer system M x , as it executes a program. 1. The adversary determines, by inspection of audiovisual outputs, whether or not M x is running a program that has the same behavior as the protected program. 2. The adversary records a snapshot (i.e., a small number of opcodes and operands, before and after FSM interpretation) of the input and output of W x . This means, the level-2 adversary can observe (a few) cleartext instructions while the level-1 adversary can only guess at them from the audio-visual outputs.
(C) System Control 0. The adversary operates the keyboard and mouse inputs of the computer system M x , as it executes the protected program. 1. The adversary can modify the statements in program P x in any desired way, before running it on computer system M x . 2. The adversary injects a small number of (arbitrary) inputs into W x , after the unit has interpreted some (arbitrary) number of opcodes and operands. These injections are at low speed, and for this reason they will generally not produce the same audio-visual output from system M x as if these inputs were normally presented to W x . Note that the level-2 adversary can interrupt the execution of P x by using a debugger before injecting instructions to W x , while the level-1 adversary can only run a modified P x from the beginning. Under our definitions above, level-0 adversaries have very few avenues of attack. They might attempt "black-box re-engineering" -inferring program code from program behavior. Such an attack is not feasible unless program behavior is trivial, and in any event it would not breach any of our security objectives.
We turn to the level-1 attacks. A cryptographically skilled adversary with knowledge of programming language semantics and our FSM algorithm would, we imagine, attempt a brute-force attack by code injection.
A plausible first step in such an attack would be to build a table of "dummy instruction sequences" d j similar to Table 2. Note that the obfuscation on these sequences is weak. Each dummy sequence consists of a short (possibly empty) prefix of non-encoded instructions, a single encoded instruction, and a short (possibly empty) suffix of non-encoded instructions. Algorithm T x will place a dummy instruction sequence at the end of the branch to a predecessor instruction, except in the (relatively rare) cases where the FSM is in the same state in both paths to the target instruction. Therefore, the suffixes will be recognizable as commonly repeated patterns before a backwards-branch or jump. Note that all control-flow opcodes are recognizable (either as class-C 1 opcodes, or as cleartext opcodes) in our Type 2.5 FSM design, although the adversary will certainly make a number of mistakes in the recognition of branching opcodes wherever instruction boundaries are obscure in the encoded code due to the differing operand syntax in L P 0 and L P x . For example, a 0xEB byte in the encoded sequence is reasonably likely to be an encoded branch opcode but it may also be an operand.
The adversary might examine the O(n 2 ) loops to be reasonably certain of having discovered all suffixes, so hypothesizing d j may take days, but not months, if n < 256. Here, n denotes the number of states in the FSM. The prefixes can be recognized as commonly repeated short sequences that occur immediately before a single (variable) instruction that precedes a suffix. The attacker can prune the list of possible dummy sequences by discarding any prefix-suffix pair that is not a no-op for at least one choice of (variable) instruction semantics.
The next step in this brute-force code-injection attack is to find a sensitive loop, that is, a loop in which the modification of a single opcode will visibly and quickly affect program operation (a level-1 observation). We imagine that an adversary will quickly discover such a loop, if they inject arbitrary opcodes into randomly chosen loops. The attacker should also insert a short no-op sequence at this position, to confirm that program correctness is not hypersensitive to loop timing. observations and controls on a modified P x for their machine M x . After n 2 such discoveries, the FSM is completely cracked. This attack will take O(n 4 ) observations and controls, where each observation (of whether or not program correctness has been impaired) can be accomplished in a few seconds. This is thus a (barely) feasible attack: a dedicated adversary will crack a single FSM in a few months.
Faster attacks may exist, of course. As in any cryptographic security analysis, we can only place a lower bound on an attacker's "crack time" if we are able to enumerate, and then analyze, all possible attacks. This is generally not feasible; there is always the possibility of an attacker finding a previously unknown attack that will run much more quickly than any known attack. However, our system will be secure against level-1 attack unless someone, at some time, devises a more efficient means of attack than the brute-force code-injection attack described above.
If the brute-force attack described above is considered to be a significant security risk in a certain application, then we can easily modify our translation process to increase the adversary's search space. We could use multiple "dummy sequences" for each instruction. We could randomize the locations in which we insert "dummy sequences" (our translation algorithm T x could insert a dummy sequence at any point in the straight-line code leading up to a branchpoint in P 0 ). We could use a Type-2 or Type-2.5 design without a partition between branching and non-branching opcodes. We could use a Type-3 FSM to make it harder for the attacker to recognize no-op suffixes and prefixes. Finally, we could use a Type-4 FSM to increase n. We intend to explore these options in future work.
We now briefly consider level-2 adversaries. A level-2 adversary can correlate the outputs with the inputs of the FSM, where these inputs are the ones associated with any desired "breakpoint" in a (possibly modified) P x . This ability will greatly speed the brute-force attack described above for our level-1 adversary, and it will allow new attack strategies such as directly observing the translation λ i (c z ) of an instruction c z that occurs in (hypothesised) dummy sequences in P x . Thus a single observation and control can be targeted at each of the FSM's n 2 state transitions, so a level-2 attacker will "crack" a FSM in O(n 2 ) observations and controls, each taking a few seconds.
When our design is applied to typical instruction sets, for example Java bytecode or x86 machine code, then n ≈ 200. In this case, the level-2 attack described above is quite potent. We therefore recommend, on the basis of our security analysis, that our FSM should be implemented in physically secure hardware on the CPU chip, with mechanisms to obstruct logic analyzers (i.e., [14] ).
We have considered more complex FSM designs, with more than one state per opcode, however, we believe all such designs would not be feasible for the foreseeable fu-ture. When n > 256, the RAM storage for the FSM's statetransition table becomes larger than n 2 = 65, 536 bytes. This will be expensive to fabricate on a CPU chip, and if it is placed off-chip then it will be difficult to secure against direct observation by the attacker.
We close our security analysis with a caution. Our translation system is essentially cryptographic in nature, so it should only be used to translate long programs that have been "randomized" (i.e., obfuscated) before they are translated by our T x . Otherwise the attacker will be able to make a likely guess to the cleartext, which may greatly speed their attack.
Related Work
The most commonly proposed method for hiding interpretation is program encryption [16] , [17] . Figure 11 illustrates a typical scheme in which an encrypted program E(P 0 ) is delivered to the user, and a decrypter E −1 including a decryption key k is put in a non accessible area of a computer system M k . This E −1 decrypts E(P 0 ), and puts the resultant P 0 in a random-access memory R. Then, this P 0 is passed to the interpreter W 0 for execution. In this approach, E(P 0 ) itself is not understandable to the user. Also, many different programs can run on a single system M k , and they are easily updatable.
There are two types of architectures that can implement this approach: (1) R is the processor's ICache (instruction cache), e.g., XOM [18] , AEGIS [19] and Cerium [20] , and (2) a very large secure R is provided by the Operating System, e.g., Trusted Computing (also known as TCPA, Palladium and NGSCB) promoted by TCG [21] . In the former case, the ICache miss penalty is increased by the decryptor's latency. Since the long blocklengths of strong cryptography add considerable latancy, it is intolerable in many applications. Consider what happens on each unpredicted branch into a not-yet-decrypted block. All bytes in this block, prior to the branch target, must be fetched and decrypted before execution can recommence. By contrast, our FSM-based approach has dummy instructions inserted into cipher text (i.e., translated program) controlling the decryptor (i.e., FSM-based interpreter) so that it allows something akin to random-access to all branch targets (but only from the source of the branch) without losing synchronization. We expect that opcode translation c i → c i by the FSM would take only 1 clock cycle, which would not not cause significant performance degradation in either the simplified processor pipeline shown in Figure 3 or the deeper pipelines of modern microprocessors.
In the latter case of a large secure RAM, there is no additional ICache miss penalty. However, there is a startup penalty since the entire program must be decrypted before execution, while our FSM can start immediately. Another concern is that, in this architecture, we need to trust the OS. However, since it is difficult to guarantee that the OS has no bugs or security holes, our interpretation obfuscation can add another layer of protection. In addition, since building a secure RAM may increase the cost, our approach may be an attractive approach. In our approach, building the FSM-based interpreter W x is easily realized by adding a small FSM unit to current hardware-based virtual machines (such as [22] , [23] ) and reconfigurable processors.
Program encryption may also be employed at the bus level of a CPU architecture, rather than at the memory level [24] . In this case, the address of the memory location may be used as part of the cryptographic key. Typically the blocklength of the cypher is short: for efficiency reasons it may be a single 8-bit memory word. (Note that if long blocklengths and strong cryptographic methods were used, then the bus-encryption method would incur the latency penalties noted in our discussion of Figure 11 .) Because of its short blocklength, the bus-encryption method is highly susceptible to brute-force chosen cyphertext attacks. A level-1 attacker, in our taxonomy of Section 4, may place an arbitrary cyphertext in memory and observe system behaviour. Kuhn has used this technique in a level-2 attack on the bus-encryption security microcontroller DS5002FP. His brute-force search revealed a short cyphertext sequence that had the effect of block-translating all encrypted bytes in the system memory [24] . Kuhn's attack is not feasible against our method, because the CPU in our system has no instructions that would export decoded opcodes outside the CPU core.
We believe that the encryption of code, obfuscation of code and obfuscation of interpretation are not exclusive techniques, and indeed that all of these techniques can and should be used as complementary techniques in highly secure software systems. In our technical report [10] , we discuss other techniques (e.g., [25] ) that may be used to hide program interpretation.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a framework for obfuscating the program interpretation, which is more powerful than code obfuscation, and is faster and cheaper than encryption schemes. We defined a FSM-based interpreter w x that provides context-dependent semantics to program instructions. We also defined a program translator T x to systematically construct a program P x , which is executable with w x , from a given program P 0 written in a conventional programming language. Our case study of a "Type 2.5" translation of an x86 assembly-language P 0 into an "x86-like" P x showed that instructions in P x have nonstatic semantics, i.e., functionality is hidden from program users, yet P x is still functionally equivalent to P 0 . Our preliminary security analysis highlighted some areas where our design could be improved, and we conclude that our design should only be used to translate long programs that have been "randomized" (i.e., obfuscated) before they are translated. In the future, we should develop a method for operand encoding since operand values leak information about opcodes. We will also develop detailed designs for interpreters of Type 1, 3 and 4, and we intend to clarify their advantages and shortcomings.
